Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) is an essential attribute of Smart Grid. To ensure secure communication for smart metering one must ensure that the data which is sent or received is authorized and confidential. This article deals with a hybrid encryption scheme for unicast, multicast and broadcast communication in AMI. To ensure confidentiality, integrity and authenticity, a Key Management Scheme (KMS) for hybrid communication modes is proposed. The proposed scheme provides excellent level of security and reduces the computational load on Smart Meter (SM).
Introduction
Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) establishes a network of Smart Meters (SM) and Data Collectors (DC) to forward data and control signals between Utility and Consumers in Smart Grid (SG). The communication network should be secure enough to prevent intruders from gaining access to the system, diagnose and inject any harmful data which could jeopardize the system operations 3 . According to Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), Cyber Security of power grid becomes significant as the infrastructure becomes increasingly interconnected 2 . The challenges to be addressed in AMI are diverse from normal IT infrastructure, where center entity security is given more importance than client nodes.
SG operations such as demand prediction, dynamic load management, dynamic tariff, and demand response (DR) depend on the intelligent communications between SM and utility 1 . Security threats are not limited to dissatisfied employees, terrorists and industrial spying but also natural disasters, component failures and user faults 17, 2 . AMI forwards data to the Wide Area Network (WAN) and the Meter Data Management System (MDMS) 4 . Figure 1 describes the overall AMI architecture. SM acts as gateway to track usage of consumers, disconnect users via software, dynamic pricing information exchange, net metering of conventional and integrated energy resources like solar and wind 5 . The energy sector has been identified as a prominent domain for cyber-attacks worldwide 19 . SMs are open and exposed to the outside world, hence more prone to cyber-attacks. The intruder can manipulate consumption data, inject false data, and send false requests, which results in Identity spoofing, Eavesdropping and Denial of Service (DoS). AMI communication could be classified into three modes 4 , (i) Unicast-It is the direct communication between SM and Utility/DC and it mainly deals with the communication of usage data from SM to Utility, selection of DR projects (ii) Multicast and (iii) Broadcast-Communication between a group of SMs in a locality or area which primarily deals with issuing of DR projects to a locality, dynamic tariff etc.
To ensure confidentiality, integrity and authenticity, which are important aspects of cyber security, a KMS is needed to facilitate key generation, key refreshing and key distribution 13 in AMI. Most of the existing KMS schemes consider only encryption and authentication of individual SM and Utility. These techniques leave out the need for the KMS for hybrid communication modes such as unicast, multicast and broadcast 8 . The generation, distribution and refreshing of keys for large networks of SMs is challenging. In this article a KMS considering unicast, multicast and broadcast is proposed and the implementation feasibility is evaluated on an embedded platform. The scheme guarantees forward and backward security in multicast and broadcast communication.
Related works
Existing literature under the scope of AMI security concentrates mainly on unicast communication. Kamto et al., 11 proposed a light weight key distribution system based on Symmetric Key Encryption (SKE) and Public Key Cryptography (PKC) with help of Meter ID and public key from a Certificate Authority (CA). A Physically Unclonable Function (PUF), which focuses on the security between SM and Utility, was introduced by M.Nabeel et al. 6 PUF relies on hardware encryption scheme and is based on ANSI-C12 standard 7 . A scheme for in-network collaborative authentication and message passing of SMs based on mutual authentication is projected by Yan et al. 12 This strategy reduces the overhead of authentication but the aggregation of data generates computational overhead and storage crisis in a large AMI network 16 . M. Thomas 15 describes a new Key Distribution System (KDS), which reduces the overhead of utility or a third party CA in key exchange and key distribution.
N. Liu et al., 8 proposed a KMS for hybrid modes-unicast, multicast and broadcast communication. The KMS scheme is based on the principle of tree graph 10 . Even though the method by Liu 8 , gives an impression about hybrid communication, the group key update is inefficient and prone to de-synchronization attack 9 . If SM is tampered or communication is interrupted, the synchronization with Utility is lost and this might lead to de-synchronization attack by intruders 9 . In 9 , Z. Wan proposed a Scalable Key Management (SKM) for AMI based on hybrid scheme of Liu 8 . This method exploits the tree-graph approach better than Liu 8 . In 13 , M. Benmalek gave a scheme based on OFT (One-way Function Tree) graph technique 10 is used here to have scalable and secure communication. Cases where SMs having registered for two or more DR projects will have two or more group key stored from parent nodes. Only the group key to which SM's tree-graph belong will be stored as home group key, along with the OFT path. The Entire graph is not stored in SM to reduce overhead 13 . The methods 7, 11 and 14 which focus only on unicast communication, satisfy the security need for AMI. However these methods when used for multicast and broadcast, demands high computation and fails to meet the time constraints. Even though 15 does not support use of CA for issuing the certificates for SMs and Server, it reduces complexity. Security is compromised if a SM is physically tampered. Hence it is better to use CA for issuing identity, to have integrity and authentication of messages.
Secure multicast and broadcast communication based on OFT graph is discussed in 8, 9, and 13 . The tree graph approach ensures both forward and backward security. Forward security means an evicted SM cannot obtain the new key from old multicast or broadcast group. Backward security means a new member cannot gain access to any other old group. The OFT approach 10 is a bottom up approach and the trouble of group key generation is distributed among the child node and parent node. Considering SM as a child node with limited resources, it is not reasonable to assert the SM to compute and store the group keys. The chances of physical tampering also exist. Considering all these constraints this article discusses a technique where multicast and broadcast group keys are generated and secured in the powerful utility server. The proposed KMS uses distinct session keys similar to N.Liu 8 and in addition, the concept of PKC and CA is used. Identity check using signature from CA ensures the originality of end to end communication and thus prevents attacks and de-synchronization due to tampering and spoofing of SM. Here a top down approach based on OFT is followed where the Server is responsible for generation, management, and refreshing of group keys.
Proposed scheme
The proposed scheme establishes a KMS scheme for unicast, multicast and broadcast communication modes. The AMI network topology considered is depicted in Figure 2 . Here the Center Station (CS) or Utility takes the role of main server. The identity of each entity such as SM, and CS is issued by a CA. The identity of each entity can be updated depending upon the necessities of the utility. Table 1 explains the abbreviations and symbols used in the proposed scheme. 
Unicast communication
PKC along with SKE is used for the secure message exchange. The CA will issue Identity Certificate of CS to SMs and CS will store the Identity of each SM. The public and private key pairs for CS and SMs will be issued by CA at the time of network establishment and updated at frequent intervals. The confidentiality of message is achieved through encryption using session key which will be generated by CS at the time of request from SM. Session key is generated using Random function and will expire after each session. The three steps involved in secure message exchange are discussed below.
Handshake process
A handshake between SMi and CS is done to check the authenticity. SMi will send its identity to CS using PKC and identity is verified using the certificate issued by CA. The integrity of message is checked using HMAC. After the verification of SMi, CS will send its identity IDcs to SMi using the same steps using PKC.
Step 1. HS = IDSMi + Cdate + Ctime
Step 2.
E (HS) = Pri (Pbs (HS)) Step 3. Sign = HMAC (E (HS)) Step 4. D (E (HS)) = Pbi (Prs (E (HS))

Session key generation
After the handshake process, CS will generate the session key Sxi and send it to the SMi using PKC.
Step 1. Sxi = Random (IDSMi).
Step 2. E (Sxi) = Prs (Pbi (Sxi + Cdate + Ctime)
Step 3. Sign = HMAC (E (Sxi))
Step 4. D (E (Sxi)) = Pbs (Pri (E (Sxi))
Message encryption using session key
The session key received from CS is used by the respective SMi to encrypt the message using SKE and later encrypted using PKC. The message is usually meter data, selection of DR project, or load control from CS. In case of load control the message is from CS to SMi, where message encryption is done at CS and forwarded to SMi using the session key produced. In unicast mode, key refreshing is done for each session. A new session key is generated and the old key is replaced to enhance confidentiality.
Step 1. Eski (MD) = Sxi (Meter_Data + Cdate + Ctime)
Step 2. E (Eski (MD)) = Pri (Pbs (Eski (MD)
Step 3. Sign = HMAC (E (Eski (MD)))
Step 4. D (E (Eski (MD)) = Pbi (Prs (E (Eski (MD))
Step 5. Dski (MD) = Sxi (Eski (MD))
Multicast communication
Multicast communication is required for the publishing of DR projects, electrical pricing information and remote load control. In multicast communication, the session key generated for each individual SMs are combined using bitwise exclusive OR (XOR) function to create a group session key Gxi. This reduces the time to generate separate group keys, as the existing session keys of SMs are used in the generation of group key. This is mainly adopted from the top down approach of OFT. The difference from normal OFT is that the server or CS is responsible for the generation of session keys and group key for a particular group and thus the burden on SM is alleviated.
Forward secrecy is maintained in such a way that, if a SM leave a particular group, the evicted SM will not know the new group key for the next multicast session. The new group key generated depends on the new individual session keys of SMs in the updated group. The same is valid for backward secrecy where new SM will not have any information regarding the old group key. The rest of the encryption is based on the SKE and PKC. For PKC a new group private -public key pair for SMs belonging to the particular group will be generated and certified by CA at the time of multicast communication. The identity check of each entity is done as discussed in unicast mode.
Group key generation
The Group keys are generated by bitwise XOR of SMs session key. The session key will be generated at the time of multicast communication by server.
Step 1. Gxi = Sx0 Sx1 Sx2 …… Sxi Step 2. E (Gxi) = Prs (Pbgmi (Gxi + Cdate + Ctime)
Step 3. Sign = HMAC (E (Gxi))
Step 4. D (E (Gxi)) = Pbs (Prgmi (E (Gxi))
The group key, Gxi send from the CS will be decrypted by SMs of respective group and corresponding acknowledgement will be issued to the CS. There will be special cases where a particular SM wants to join or evict from a DR project, or the CS needs to control the electrical pricing for a new group of SMs. When a SM needs to join or evict from a DR project it should inform the CS through unicast message and accordingly the CS will determine a new group, evicting or adding that particular SM, and thus creating a new group key corresponding to the change occurred and the old key will be expired.
Message encryption using group key
In multicast mode derived group key is used to encrypt message with the help of SKE and PKC as in unicast mode.
Step 1. Egki (Data) = Gxi (Multicast_Data + Cdate + Ctime)
Step 2. E (Egki (Data)) = Prs (Pbgmi (Eski (MD)
Step 3. Sign = HMAC (E (Egki (Data)))
Step 4. D (E (Egki (Data)) = Pbs (Prgmi (E (Egki (MD))
Step 5. Dgki (Data) = Gxi (Egki (Data)) The SMs will decrypt the encrypted data using the public -private key pair generated by CA for multicast mode. Key refreshing policy for multicast is different from unicast. In multicast, keys will be refreshed once in a day, a week or whenever there is an addition or eviction of SMs. The group key thus generated will be directly dependent on the session key produced by CS for unicast communication prior to the establishment of the multicast communication and the key will be retained until it is refreshed by CS.
Broadcast communication
In this mode, a common symmetric key, Bk generated by bit wise XOR of session keys of SMs belonging to the broadcast is needed as in the case for multicast communication. This common key can be refreshed on a daily, weekly basis as per the requirements of the CS.
Implementation results and discussions
The CS is responsible for the generation and issuing of Session Keys -Sxi, Group Keys-Gxi and Broadcast KeyBk. The CA should be a certified external authority to issue the global identity for each of SM and the CS. It is also responsible for the issuing of public -private keys for SMs and CS, needed for unicast, multicast and broadcast communication. The certificate and public -private key pairs is issued prior the establishment of SMs in the network and is refreshed at definite intervals by CA.
The proposed scheme was implemented and evaluated on an embedded platform. Since most of SMs would be an embedded platform with low computational and storage capacity, an embedded board confining to the above constraints was selected. Raspberry Pi B+ 18 board with Debian Noobs is used as SM. CS and CA have superior computational and storage capacity and hence a PC running Ubuntu 15.04 LTS with Intel i3 core processor and 4GB RAM was considered.
The PKC scheme used is RSA 1024 bit and SKE scheme used is AES 128 bit. Python Cryptography 20 library was used for the implementation of PKC and SKE. The Unicast connection between SM and CS is established using Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) over Ethernet. In Unicast implementation multithreading is used to accommodate multiple connections from SMs to CS. Multicast and Broadcast, connection is established using UDP, since multicast and broadcast over TCP is not viable until it is customized to do so. One drawback of using UDP is that acknowledgment from SMs is not possible. So in future expansion, there is a possibility for development of a customized protocol or use protocol like Zero-Copy 19 where multicast and broadcast with acknowledgement is possible. Table 3 shows the execution time taken for unicast, multicast and broadcast communications of the proposed scheme when implemented in the platforms selected. Here variation in the execution time of Raspberry Pi operating in different modes are presented. The results show that in unicast communication there is significant difference in time of execution on client's side. It can be observed that in unicast there is increase in the execution time at SMs, when compared to multicast and broadcast. The same is opposite in case of CS, mainly due to the RSA encryption. In unicast mode SM is encrypting data while CS is just decrypting it. Multicast and broadcast involves encryption of message at CS and SM just decrypts the message. In the case of multicast and broadcast, the results prove that there is a decrease in execution time due to shifting of computation to CS side. Thus the proposed scheme not only decreases the computation of SM but also ensures confidentiality, integrity and authenticity.
Conclusions
A hybrid encryption scheme for unicast, multicast and broadcast communication in AMI network is proposed. The concept of OFT is efficiently is used in a top down approach. The implementation feasibility was evaluated on an embedded platform emulating SM. The implementation results show that the scheme shifts computations to the highly equipped utility servers and reduces the burden on SMs. The scheme considers a flexible key update process, which could be determined by the Utility. Forward and backward secrecy is ensured; meeting the confidentiality, authenticity and integrity requirements of AMI. The proposed scheme could be adapted for multicast and broadcast communication; through tailored operating system and protocols.
